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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A government running a deficit needs to turn to financial markets to place this additional public 
debt. Newly issued public bonds compete for financing with bonds issued by private agents. The 
additional demand created by the fiscal expansion pushes up interest rates, and eventually 
crowds out private investment. Not all economists agree that consolidating public finances would 
immediately reduce pressure on interest rates, however. Despite a vast literature testing crowding 
out, there is actually surprisingly little robust empirical support for this hypothesis.1 
 
Interest rates are insulated from fiscal policy under two alternative conditions. The first explanation 
for a zero impact of deficits on aggregate macroeconomic variables is that economic agents 
anticipate paying down currently high deficits with higher taxes in the future. Under Ricardian 
Equivalence, private saving fully offsets the effect of higher public consumption (for a given level 
of taxation). Few economists would consider the assumptions underlying the Ricardian 
Equivalence null as realistic, however. More elaborate macroeconomic models that depart from 
the baseline Ricardian assumption easily find real economic effects of fiscal policy. There is by 
now also a large body of empirical evidence that clearly refutes the Ricardian hypothesis 
(Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). 
 
A second explanation for the lacking crowding out effect is capital mobility. Fiscal deficits need not 
be financed by domestic financial resources only. Capital flows between economically integrated 
economies, offsetting any interest rate differentials that follow upon an increase in the domestic 
supply of government bonds. Under full capital mobility, domestic and foreign agents alike 
diversify their asset portfolio across borders. As a consequence, the budget decision of one 
government affects the financing conditions of all other governments on international capital 
markets. Domestic interest rates rise in proportion to the amount of bonds issued worldwide. For a 
small open economy, the crowding out effect would tend to zero. In practice, capital mobility is far 
from complete, as imperfect information, risk aversion and imperfect substitutability of domestic 
and foreign bonds introduce a home bias in portfolio decisions. As a consequence, the spillover is 
likely to be less than complete. 
 
The empirical models that are used to assess the crowding out effect of fiscal policy fail to account 
for this spillover. A baseline test for crowding out typically regresses a domestic interest rate on 
some domestic fiscal indicator. Even simple extensions of this model to include the effects of fiscal 
policy in open economies require quite restrictive assumptions on parameterisation. Often, one 
simply controls for a set of additional (foreign) explanatory variables. Usually, only a particular 
subset of countries is examined, or identical restrictions are imposed on the transmission of fiscal 
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policy across all countries. Due to the dimension of open economy models, even simple 
extensions quickly exhaust the available degrees of freedom. In practice, the interactions are 
much more complex. Spillover works out on global financial markets, and affects a large group of 
countries contemporaneously. 
 
In this paper, we use spatial techniques to account for this spillover. We deliberately keep the 
baseline model as simple as possible to make the strongest possible case for spillover. We test a 
panel model that explains interest rates by fiscal variables to analyse crowding out of fiscal policy. 
The spatial model simply extends this baseline model for the spillover effect in all nearby foreign 
economies. In particular, we test the spillover of interest rates on financial markets in a spatial lag 
model. We then control also for spatially distributed economic linkages in a spatial error model. 
We test this model on a large cross section of OECD and emerging market economies over the 
period 1990-2005. Our main finding is that the domestic crowding effect of fiscal policy is sizeable. 
But the spillover on financial markets offsets the significant effects of larger deficits on interest 
rates. We cannot identify whether this spillover is the direct effect of financial market integration, 
or the by-product of the economic integration of countries. Spillover is much stronger in the mid-
nineties when there were major crises, or policy actions were being coordinated between 
governments. Various measures of cross-country linkages give broadly similar results. The main 
findings are also robust to alternative specifications and data definitions. Finally, we find the 
spillover to be quite strong among EU countries. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide a simple theoretical model for testing 
crowding out, and the effects of financial and economic integration. We consequently specify the 
spatial model for including this spillover in section 3. We then continue in section 4 by discussing 
the results of the baseline model of spillover of fiscal policies, and provide several robustness 
checks. The final section summarises the main results, and discusses some policy implications. 
 
2 CROWDING OUT AND SPILLOVER 
 
Crowding out of interest rates is typically analysed in a partial equilibrium ‘loanable funds’ model 
(Barro, 1992). This model determines the interest rate on assets from the equilibrium between the 
demand and supply bonds. Both the private sector and the government turn to financial markets to 
look for finance. Firms invest the capital raised on stock or bond markets (b) to invest in new 
capital stock. Additional government financing is necessary when the government runs a deficit 
(d). Financial intermediaries channel the demand for bonds of the private sector, both at home (f) 
and abroad (f*) sector, to match the total supply of domestic bonds (b+d): 
 
*ffdb        (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1 See the contrasting arguments of the European Commission (2004) and the Bush Administration (Gale and Orszag, 
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We can illustrate all the major points of the analysis with this simple partial equilibrium model.2 
Consider the case in which the government runs a higher deficit d. For a given demand for bonds 
f+f*, the increased supply of debt will put downward pressure on the price of government bonds. 
Ceteris paribus, this rise in bond yields is making it more difficult for the private sector to seek 
finance on capital markets: government finance crowds out private bonds b on capital markets 
(Cebula, 1998). However, the demand for additional bonds is likely affected by the government’s 
decision to lend. Under two alternative theoretical conditions, private sector savings fully offset the 
additional supply of bonds. 
 
First, if economic agents anticipate the pay down of higher deficits they set aside savings for the 
higher tax burden in future periods. In the limit, domestic private saving fully offsets the effect of 
the higher public dissaving d. Under this Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis, a higher deficit d does 
not have an impact on aggregate macroeconomic variables at all. Many economists consider 
Ricardian Equivalence as a reasonable starting point for the analysis of fiscal policy. Few would 
endorse it as a realistic description, however. The view that private savings offset the change in 
public savings is not based on a firm empirical rejection since Ricardian Equivalence is not directly 
testable. But plenty of empirical studies have examined the alternative hypothesis that fiscal policy 
has any real economic effects. Recent evidence seems to converge on at least some 
expansionary effects on major economic variables (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). More elaborate 
macroeconomic models that depart from the baseline Ricardian assumption easily find support for 
these real economic effects of fiscal policy. It therefore seems a safe assumption to reject the 
Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis.  
 
Second, when financial markets are integrated across borders, the foreign demand for bonds f* 
can shift as well. In open economies that are economically integrated and do not impede trade or 
financial flows, capital flows move massively so as to offset any interest rate differential. Under 
these circumstances, the supply of savings is very interest rate elastic: even a small rise in d is 
likely to trigger a large increase in f*. The higher is capital mobility, the weaker will be the reaction 
of domestic interest rates to a change in the supply of domestic bonds. Under the null of full 
capital mobility, the rise in interest rates is simply proportional to each country’s total indebtedness 
on the global bond market. Consequently, due to the spillover on international bond markets, the 
crowding out effect of deficits is only a fraction of the total rise under autarchy. In reality, this 
dilution is likely to be less than complete as capital mobility is partial: domestic private agents 
prefer to invest in domestic financial assets. As a consequence, domestic savings and investment 
are highly correlated (the ‘Feldstein-Horioka’ puzzle). This ‘home bias’ depends on information 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
2003). 
2 These partial equilibrium models have been extended for intertemporal saving behaviour (Laubach, 2003; Engen and 
Hubbard, 2004). Dynamic macroeconomic models that include both debt non-neutrality and long term interest rates 
have not been developed yet, due to their complexity. 
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imperfections on foreign financial markets. Neither are financial assets in different countries 
perfect substitutes, due to exchange rate, inflation and default risk. Due to differences in 
regulation across countries, risk averse agents may prefer to invest in domestic assets only. 
Moreover, private agents are likely to hold a larger portion of domestic public debt. Governments 
often prefer to place debt only domestically in order to avoid having to pay exchange rate premia, 
and as a commitment not to default on debt put with its own citizens. As a consequence, complete 
spillover is unlikely, yet it is hard to put a precise size on the spillover effect. The spillover is likely 
to be stronger between economies that are more closely integrated. 
 
3 A SPATIAL TEST FOR CROWDING OUT 
 
The most common test for crowding out based on the loanable funds model takes a very simple 
form: it basically explains domestic interest rates by domestic fiscal balances (in this case, the 
surplus ts ). 
 
ttt si   .    (2a) 
 
We measure by the coefficient   the degree of crowding out. The large number of studies that 
have employed various definitions of the government surplus, interest rates, econometric 
approaches and data sets to test (2a) can basically give support for any view.3 There are two 
cases in which we would not reject 0 . First, we would not find a significant crowding out effect 
under Ricardian Equivalence. Second, we may not be able to reject 0  if there is capital 
mobility between open economies.  
 
However, a specification like (2a) does not account for these spillover effects of financial markets. 
Basically, the test for crowding out only considers domestic variables, but does not account for the 
integration of the domestic economy with foreign economies. Existing empirical evidence on the 
effect of integration is little, and uses alternative ways for netting out the international linkages 
from the domestic crowding out effect. Due to the omission of these foreign variables that explain 
the spillover effect,   would be biased downward. The reasoning is that the domestic effect of 
fiscal expansions will likely be larger once a proxy tX  for the foreign demand for bonds f* is 
introduced. 
 
tttt Xsi   .   (2b) 
 
One alternative is to condition the relation between interest rates and deficits on foreign capital 
inflows (Cebula and Koch, 1994). Another is to assess directly the effects of deficits on interest 
                                                          
3 See the references in Barth et al. (1991) and the overview article by the European Commission (2004). 
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rates abroad. In (2c), we explain interest rates in country A by the crowding out by deficits in 
country A, and in addition a direct crowding out effect of deficits in country B. 
 
ttBtAtA ssi   ,,, .   (2c) 
 
The coefficient   measures the size of the spillover effect. In order to estimate a specification 
similar to (2c), plenty of identifying restrictions are necessary that severely reduce the dimension 
of the open economy model. Usually, only a particular subset of countries can be examined, or 
identical restrictions are imposed on the transmission across all countries in a panel. Cohen and 
Garnier (1991) find a positive effect of US deficits on interest rates in several G7 countries. 
Ardagna et al. (2007) find significant crowding out effects from both domestic and foreign fiscal 
expansions in a panel of OECD countries. Marcellino (2002) or Giuliodori and Beetsma (2005) 
consider the impact of shocks to German fiscal policy on the French and Italian economy. Paesani 
et al. (2006) take a somewhat different approach by identifying spillover from shocks to bond 
markets on internationally linked capital markets. This allows them also to consider the direction of 
the spillover. 
 
An alternative control that models the linkages between domestic and foreign bond markets, is to 
include the level of foreign interest rates in (2b). 
 
ttBtAtA isi   ,,, .   (2d) 
 
Quite a few papers include foreign interest rates in the analysis of crowding out. Chinn and 
Frankel (2007) take the German long term rate as the benchmark in their study of US fiscal policy. 
Caporale and Williams (2002) or Paesani et al. (2006) reduce their sample to a few G7 economies 
and use in turn the interest rate from the other country as a benchmark. The assumption that 
domestic interest rates directly depends on a single foreign benchmark rate, is rather strong. 
Ideally, one would like to control for the level of interest rates in various countries. Most papers 
construct as the benchmark interest rate an aggregate ‘world’ interest rate. Tanzi and Lutz (1993) 
argue that at the world level all spillover effects should cancel out and a significant crowding out 
effect of fiscal policy restored. They aggregate all domestic deficits and examine the effect on 
global interest rates. Ford and Laxton (1999) and De Haan and Knot (1995) do the same for 
OECD and EU countries respectively. Faini (2006) calculates an average euro area interest rate, 
and considers the fiscal effect on interest rates at home and at EMU level contemporaneously in a 
panel framework. In empirical applications, modelling the transmission across financial markets 
requires quite restrictive assumptions. Assumptions like these likely bias the direction and the 
strength of the spillover effect. We would expect that on financial markets, spillover is at work 
between different markets contemporaneously. Spillover should also be stronger between markets 
that are more closely connected. 
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A convenient way to think of these complex linkages is with an exogenously specified matrix W 
that specifies the structure and intensity of the ‘closeness’ of different observations. The element 
wij of W represents the proximity between two observations i and j. A common specification for this 
weight matrix W is physical contiguity. Bordering regions are believed to have closer links. It is 
straightforward to find other W’s that reflect either economic distance between countries, such as 
geographic distance, trade, level of economic development, cultural or institutional differences. A 
pattern of spatial interaction in a variable implies that the distribution of this variable across 
observations is not random, and therefore the co-movement of interest rates on integrated 
financial markets will bias the OLS estimates of (2a). With spatial spillover, parameter estimates 
are biased, inefficient and inconsistent (Anselin, 1988). This bias may explain the mixed findings 
in the empirical literature testing crowding out and spillover. 
 
By introducing spatial lags (i.e., interest rates in neighbouring countries) we directly control for the 
interaction with the level of interest rates in close by units. We can rewrite (2d) more generally as 
a spatial autoregressive model: 
 
tntntntn Wisi ,,,,      (3a) 
 
In specification (3a) we control the crowding out effect in country n for the interaction with interest 
rates in all neighbouring countries (the term nWi ). This is a weighted measure of interest rates in 
the countries with which a country has ‘economic links’. This spatial lag term has to be treated as 
an endogenous variable; equation (3a) can be estimated with ML-techniques. A positive (and 
significant) coefficient   indicates spillover. We can also recast the test of significance of   as a 
test for the degree of financial market integration: the larger  , the more integrated are financial 
markets. A significant spatial lag also reduces the bias in the estimate of the direct crowding out 
effect  . 
 
Financial integration is not the only factor behind the co-movement of bond markets. Real 
economic integration affects macroeconomic conditions globally, and there is quite some evidence 
for increased synchronisation of business cycles (Doyle and Faust, 2002). Instead of a direct 
spillover on financial markets, the spillover could alternatively be due to a co-movement of some 
omitted economic variables, unrelated to financial market integration, that vary across space. 
There are two possible ways to account for these effects of real economic integration. First, and 
as in equation (2b), we proxy the economic co-movement across countries by introducing other 
(domestic) macroeconomic variables. Although an OLS regression of (2b) still yields unbiased 
estimates, inference may be misleading since the precision of the estimates is affected. 
Alternatively, we can introduce such spatial links in the residuals of the empirical model. Hence, 
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2008                                               Working Papers 2008/10, 29 pages
8
we qualify model (2a) to include a spatial correlation structure of the error term n . We then 
rewrite (2a) as follows: 
tntntn
tntntn
W
si
,,,
,,,
	




    (3b) 
 
In this spatial error model, tn,	  is a white noise error term. The parameter 
  in (3b) is the spatial 
autoregressive parameter, and reflects the spillover across countries due to economic integration. 
 
Financial and real economic integration probably work in the same direction. Co-movements in 
macroeconomic factors also drive the synchronisation of financial markets. It is likely that 
economies with close economic (trade) links also have more tightly linked financial markets. As a 
consequence, the spillover effects of financial markets and economic integration may be similar, 
and hard to distinguish. This observational equivalence may cause the spatial lag and spatial error 
model to give very similar results (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000).4 
 
3.1 Specification 
 
We argue that we can recover significant crowding out effects of fiscal policy on interest rates if 
we use a spatial extension of the simple baseline model (2a) to analyse the spillover effect of 
fiscal policy. Hence, we depart from a model as (2a) and use spatial techniques to test and model 
the crowding out and spillover effect of fiscal policy. 
 
We are interested in two effects in the spatial model. In first instance, we test the crowding out 
effect of domestic deficits on domestic interest rates (  ). We expect that a higher surplus (lower 
deficit) has a significantly negative effect on interest rates. Secondly, the spatial model allows 
testing for the effect of interest rates abroad. The more interest rates rise in other countries, the 
higher will be the domestic interest rate as well. If interest rates are very close, this suggests that 
global credit markets are fairly integrated. The pool of loanable funds any government draws from 
exceeds the available funds in the domestic credit market only. We expect that this spillover effect 
will be significant, and positive. 
 
The interpretation of the spillover effect is different in the spatial lag or error model. First, in the 
spatial lag model, we look at the aggregate effect of all other countries’ interest rates on the home 
country’s interest rate. We interpret a significant spatial lag as evidence of a direct spillover of 
fiscal policy on financial markets. The spatial lag parameter   is the slope of this reaction 
                                                          
4 Models (3a) and (3b) can be combined in a general specification like that encompasses both effects. We do not test a 
general spatial model in this paper. 
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function, and measures the degree of financial integration. Positive spatial correlation in interest 
rates exists if 0 , whereas there is evidence of negative spatial correlation if 0 .5 
 
The economic interpretation of the model (3b) with spatial links in the errors is slightly different. A 
shock to the domestic interest rate, which is not explained by fiscal policy, spills over to all other 
observations that are ‘close’. Spatial correlation in the error term reflects a similar reaction of 
countries’ interest rates to shocks, because of omitted variables that are spatially correlated. This 
indicates important economic channels of spillover, but is not related to fiscal policy per se. A 
positive 
  indicates positive spatial correlation of the shocks; negative 
  shows that shocks are 
of opposite sign. 
 
3.2 Data 
 
We estimate these two spatial models on a panel of 101 countries, for which we have annual data 
on interest rates and fiscal policy covering the period 1990-2005. A panel model allows combining 
the typical analysis of domestic crowding out in a time series model, with the spillover of interest 
rates in the cross section dimension. We tie both dimensions and the structure of linkages across 
countries, with a weight matrix W that reflects geographical distance.6 Countries that are more 
distant are assumed to have weaker economic links. Geographic distance usually is a good proxy 
for economic linkages (as in the gravity model, for example). We show that our results do not 
depend on this specific assumption, and we check our results for different definitions of W. 
 
Spatial panel data models have only recently been developed, and not all their properties have 
been examined. Our starting point is the fixed effect panel model in which subsequently spatial 
dependence is accounted for by including a spatially lagged term of the dependent variable. This 
is the expression given in (3a), including a country specific fixed effect. The standard estimation 
method for the fixed effect model is to eliminate the intercept term of the regression by expressing 
all variables as a deviation from their time average, and then using standard OLS estimators. In 
presence of spatial autocorrelation it is common practice to use maximum likelihood methods to 
estimate the demeaned equation. These spatial autoregressive models are estimated through the 
maximum likelihood method of estimation developed by Elhorst (2003).7 
                                                          
5 A spatial test for financial market integration could be equally applied to other financial assets. We look at the spillover 
effects of government bonds on interest rates for two reasons. First, spillover on government bond markets is policy 
relevant. In contrast to private bond issues, fiscal policy could introduce distortions on government bond markets. I.e., 
there are not only pecuniary implications for other domestic or foreign issuers. Second, we can include many countries 
in our sample as government bonds are the most comparable asset across countries. They are usually the least risky 
asset and are traded on the most liquid market. 
6 We assign a centre to each country, and use its coordinates to calculate the distance between these centroids. We 
use a GIS software for these calculations. 
7 Consistent estimation of the individual fixed effects is not possible as n grows large, due to the incidental parameter 
problem. Anselin and Le Gallo (2008) argue that "since spatial models rely on the asymptotics in the cross-sectional 
dimension to obtain consistency and asymptotic normality of estimators, this would preclude the fixed effects model 
from being extended with a spatial lag”. However, Anselin and Le Gallo (2008) show that for consistent estimates of , 
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We use a nominal long term interest rate (5 to 10 years) as our dependent variable. Deficits are 
usually argued to affect long term interest rates. Not that many countries outside the OECD have 
been able to issue long term bonds, however. Most emerging market economies have financed 
deficits with short term bonds at a 5 years horizon at most. Similarly, fiscal data for many countries 
are available only over recent years. The surplus to GDP ratios all come from the IMF 
Government Statistics Database. As we prefer working with balanced panels over the full sample 
period, we consequently had to eliminate a large number of countries from the study. Due to 
variable data quality, we also decided to remove some outlier observations. We first run a simple 
pooled estimate and quitted the observation if the standard error exceeds three times the residual 
variance. Eventually, we have 496 observations on 31 countries over 16 years. This keeps in the 
sample mostly OECD countries and a few emerging market economies.8 
 
4 RESULTS FOR THE BASELINE MODEL 
 
4.1 Spillover on financial markets: the spatial lag model 
 
We first estimate a simple pooled OLS regression of (2a), without any further restrictions on the 
spatial effects, to replicate the crowding out effect of similar studies. Table 1 reveals a very 
significant and quite strong crowding out effect: a rise in the surplus of 1% of GDP leads to a 109 
basis points fall in the interest rate. This result continues to hold even if we impose more structure 
on the pooled model. A priori, we would prefer to use a fixed effects estimator. First, we include a 
specific group of countries. Even if we draw a number of countries from the global sample of 
economies, this draw is not random (Baltagi, 2001). Second, the specification (2a) is rather basic, 
and we do not control for other relevant determinants of interest rates. The setting of fiscal policy 
is rather heterogeneous across countries. As a consequence, the country-specific effect is likely 
correlated with the explanatory variable (the surplus). The Hausmann test indicates that a fixed 
effects estimator is indeed preferable. It has also been more common in this literature to use 
simple pooled estimates or panel fixed effects estimators (Frenkel and Chinn, 2005; Kinoshita, 
2006). We report both, and find that the panel estimates of   in the fixed or random effects 
model are very similar (Table 1). 
 
Our estimate is on the high end of the range of estimates found in the literature. In the overview 
study of the European Commission (2004), the crowding out effect varies between about 20 and 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
the demeaned spatial regressions from ML estimation like in Elhorst (2003) are appropriate. One complication with this 
is that the variance covariance matrix of the demeaned error term is different from the usual one. Alternative 
approaches to the Elhorst estimation are still a topic of ongoing research. 
8 The sample includes the following EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the UK), some other OECD countries (Australia, Canada, 
Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland, Turkey, the US) and emerging markets (Colombia, Lebanon, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand). In the Appendix, we provide a detailed description of 
the dataset and its sources. 
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100 basis points.9 For the US, the crowding out effect is usually estimated to be around 40 basis 
points (Canzoneri et al., 2002; Laubach, 2003; Engen and Hubbard, 2004). This result is also 
confirmed by VAR studies on US data, like Dai and Phillipon (2005). For EU countries, the 
crowding out effect is mostly smaller in magnitude (Faini, 2006). What explains the strong 
crowding out effect in our estimates then? Most other papers examine the crowding out effect of 
deficits in a single country. In contrast, panel studies, like ours, have found much stronger effects. 
Chinn and Frankel (2007) estimate a crowding out of interest rates between 150 and 200 basis 
points in a panel of the US and the largest EU countries. Similarly, Ardagna et al. (2007) use 
panel VAR techniques to look at the impact of deficits on interest rates in a panel of OECD 
countries and find a rise of 150 basis points after 10 years. De Haan and Knot (1995) reach 
similar conclusions for the large EU countries. Hence, the inclusion of more countries in a cross-
section analysis of deficits and interest rates typically delivers stronger crowding out effects. We 
actually observe a similar effect in single country studies in which control variables for 
international capital flows are included. Cebula and Koch (1994) find that interest rates rise by 
more than 60 basis points after a 1% increase in the deficit ratio, whereas capital flows reduce the 
effect by about 24 points. Chinn and Frankel (2007) find a stronger impact on rates, once foreign 
interest rates are controlled for. Tanzi and Lutz (1993) aggregate data for the G7 and find a rise in 
long term rates of about 150 basis points. These results suggest that a control for the spillover 
effect from other countries is important. Omission of linkages on international financial markets 
biases the findings of crowding out. 
 
As the estimate of   is quite likely biased, inefficient and inconsistent, we now introduce the 
spatial extension. In the second panel of Table 1, we present the estimates of different versions of 
the spatial lag model. The baseline estimate is the spatial lag model with fixed effects. We find 
that the crowding out effect halves in case a spatial lag is included: a deficit of 1% of GDP pushes 
up interest rates by 45 basis points. The spillover effect is very significant and quite large: a 1% 
rise in interest rates abroad also raises domestic rates by about 0.55%. The consequence is that 
an increase in the deficit of 1% will cause domestic interest rates to rise by 45 basis points. 
Consequently, the second round effect of the deficit is to push up interest rates abroad by a 
further 25 (0.55%*45pp) basis points. A government creating a deficit still faces a quite steep 
increase in domestic rates, but part of this increase spills over abroad. 
 
The crowding out effect in the spatial lag model is more in line with the results of the empirical 
studies of single countries. This suggests that the control for the spatial links indeed corrects the 
initial panel estimates. As regards our findings on spillover, it is slightly harder to compare its size. 
Most studies simply report that the domestic crowding out effect is larger than the foreign spillover 
effect. Caporale and Williams (2002) find this result for the US; and Faini (2006) reports similar 
results for the EU countries. Ardagna et al. (2007) report that the aggregate (world) deficit affects 
                                                          
9 See in particular the overview table in European Commission (2004) on pp. 153-55. 
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domestic interest rates, but its impact is less relevant than that of domestic fiscal policy. In 
different settings, other studies have found close connections between interest rates across 
borders (Minford and Peel, 2007). Nonetheless, country-specific factors still play a role in 
explaining the deviation of domestic interest rates from the evolution in worldwide interest rates 
(Breedon et al., 1999). One of the main reasons is a change in the fiscal policy stance.10 Few 
studies report the impact that international capital flows or foreign interest rates have on domestic 
interest rates. Cebula and Koch (1994) find a similarly strong reduction in interest rates (24 pp) as 
we do.  
 
The co-movement of interest rates may not just reflect the integration of financial markets. 
Economic integration makes countries susceptible to global economic developments. Trade, 
financial integration and similar economic structures raise the co-movement of business cycles 
internationally (Imbs, 2004). Economics shocks that are common to a group of countries would 
display a close synchronisation of economic variables. This might show up in a significant spillover 
effect. We introduce a time period fixed effect in the spatial panel to absorb these common 
shocks. We indeed find that the spillover effect is much smaller in this case, whereas the crowding 
out effect remains as strong (Table 1). 
 
4.2 Financial and real economic integration 
 
An alternative possibility is that the co-movements of economic variables are also spatially 
distributed. Another way to model these economic links is to incorporate a spatial structure in the 
residuals of the baseline model. The assumption is that these economic factors, except interest 
rates, are spatially distributed across economies. We estimate this spatial error panel model (3b). 
 
By controlling for these spatial linkages, we pick up a significant crowding out effect. Table 2 
shows that the results are very similar to those of the spatial lag model. Moreover, the spillover 
effect causes a 1% rise in foreign rates to raise domestic rates by 56 basis points. We can not 
identify whether spillover is due to either financial market integration, or the co-movement of 
macroeconomic variables (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000). 
 
4.3 Some control variables 
 
Alternatively, one may consider a correction of the baseline model (2a) with a spatial structure for 
the errors too naive. The factors that determine interest rates are plenty of course, and the surplus 
is certainly not the only determinant of (long-term) interest rates. One often stated reason for the 
                                                          
10 Note that for other assets than government bonds, most empirical papers find similar results on the importance of 
spillover. Ehrmann et al. (2005) find that asset prices react more strongly to domestic shocks, but still allows for a strong 
spillover between the US and EU markets.  
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ambiguous findings regarding crowding out is the contemporaneous influence of monetary policy, 
automatic fiscal stabilisers, interest payments on outstanding debt and any economic effects of 
fiscal policy itself.11 We test extensions of the spatial lag model that control for these additional 
regressors tnX , , as in (4)12 
 
tntntntntn XWisi ,,,,,      (4) 
 
It is quite common in the empirical literature on crowding out to directly test the effect of public 
debt on (long term) interest rates, instead of using deficits. The argument is that public debt 
substitutes private capital, and hence it the stock of debt that has an impact on the level of interest 
rates (Engen and Hubbard, 2004). Moreover, the initial fiscal position of countries matters for 
crowding out. Fiscal policy has non-linear effects. At higher levels of debt, interest rates typically 
react more strongly to higher deficits (Ardagna et al., 2007). In particular, emerging market 
economies start paying a higher risk premium for fiscal indiscipline (Zoli, 2004).  
 
Table 3 reports the estimates of the spatial panel lag model with fixed effects for a model 
augmented with public debt. Controlling for public debt gives an interesting result. The crowding 
out effect of the surplus becomes less strong: interest rates rise by a mere 16 basis points after a 
1% rise in the deficit. Ardagna et al. (2007) find a short run effect of deficits of about 10 basis 
points, after controlling for debt. This effect accumulates over time to about 100 basis points, 
especially as the debt ratio rises. The impact of debt – albeit significant - is very small. 
 
These results fall in a similar range as in the other studies. Single country studies find rather 
modest crowding out effect of higher public debt. The consensus estimate ranges between 2 and 
7 basis points for the US with a variety of methodologies (Ford and Laxton, 1999; Canzoneri et al., 
2002; Laubach, 2003; Engen and Hubbard, 2004).13 As for the impact of the surplus on interest 
rates, studies that control for links between different countries, or use a cross-section approach, 
find slightly stronger effects of debt. For example, the impact of debt is slightly stronger for the EU 
countries than in the US (Faini, 2006). Pooled estimates for a group of OECD countries show a 
rise of about 25 basis points after a rise in domestic debt (Ford and Laxton, 1999; Orr et al., 
1995). A similar effect is found by Tanzi and Lutz (1993). 
 
                                                          
11 These effects could cause some problems of endogeneity in (2a), but these feedback effects are likely small. IV 
estimates are not considered in most of the literature, however. Spatial panel models that control for endogeneity of the 
regressors have not been developed yet. 
12 In the spatial econometrics literature, the bottom-up approach for searching an adequate specification prevails. The 
so-called Hendry approach is not common. Florax et al. (2003) demonstrate that the specific-to-general approach 
slightly outperforms the Hendry approach in the case of the estimation of linear spatial models. 
13 The only exception is Friedman (2005), who finds that a 1% rise in the debt ratio increases interest rates by 90 basis 
points. 
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Interestingly, the spillover effect is much stronger and is estimated very precisely. Three quarters 
of a 1% rise in the interest rates spills over to close by countries. After all crowding out and 
spillover effects have worked out, a 1% rise in the deficit will push up interest rates by 16 basis 
points at home, and by 12 basis points abroad. 
 
Long-term interest rates are very much influenced by monetary policy in the short term.14 We 
control in two different ways for its effect. First, we include a short-term interest rate in the 
specification. At short horizons, monetary policy sets interest rates to stabilise inflation and output. 
Central bank decisions directly influence the financing conditions of the government (and its 
interest payments on outstanding debt). The insignificance of the crowding out effect confirms that 
the short run impact of a higher deficit may be significant in raising interest rates, but it is not very 
important and it is blurred by the impact of monetary policy. But once a control for short term rates 
is included, the spatial lag coefficient   is negative. Such a negative spillover effect can only be 
explained by a substantial spatial transmission of changes in short term interest rates, which offset 
the co-movement of long term interest rates between neighbouring countries. Other studies also 
illustrate this co-movement of short term rates across borders (Minford and Peel, 2007; Ehrmann 
et al., 2005). Second, we include also the inflation rate.15 Higher inflation eases pressures on 
deficits as it erodes the real value of outstanding debt. We find that the spillover is not really 
affected by the spatial variations in inflation. 
 
4.4 Time variation in the crowding out effect 
 
Financial and economic integration can explain why changes in asset markets have large effects 
on other financial markets. Globalisation is often argued to have strengthened the spillover 
between economies in two different ways. On the one hand, as integration is a gradual process, 
we are likely to observe a change over time in the strength of spillover. On the other hand, there 
could be turbulence in the spillover channel due to financial or economic crises. Tranquil periods 
in which there is a normal degree of real and financial interdependence suddenly switch to an 
environment with wild co-movements during currency and financial crises (Claessens et al., 2001). 
Some authors argue this distinction is only apparent, and interdependence is determined by real 
factors that change only gradually over time (Boyer et al., 1999; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). The 
results in Table 1 showed that common shocks might be more important in explaining 
interdependencies across countries than a genuine spillover from other economies. If interest 
rates are indeed driven by some common factors in any given year, then we would not expect to 
                                                          
14 Crowding out is obscured by static specification of the relation between deficits and interest rates in (2a). The reason 
is that government bonds are actually traded on financial markets. As financial markets are forward looking, it is the 
anticipation of upcoming deficits, rather than the current fiscal balance, that results in higher long term rates instantly. A 
few studies include expectations about the deficit or ratings, and directly analyse the effect of these budget projections 
on expected interest rates (Laubach, 2003). These data are available for a limited sample only. Papers that look into the 
effect of deficit announcements by the government, or analyse the effect of deficits on risk premia usually ignore the 
spillover effects of fiscal policy, with the exception of Kitchen (1996). 
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see a spillover effect in a year-by-year estimation of the spatial lag model. All interdependencies 
would be absorbed by the constant term in this cross-section model. Note that if spatial links are 
predominantly determined by contagious crises across emerging economies, the annual 
frequency of fiscal data may not pick up the high frequency movements on financial markets due 
to sudden fiscal crises. 
 
We turn again to the standard spatial lag model for explaining the variation in interest rates by 
fiscal variables but estimate it at a cross-sectional level for each year. Note that the efficiency of 
these cross-section estimates is smaller than in the panel case. Figure 1 plots the coefficients of 
an ML estimation of the baseline regression over the sample 1990 to 2005. 
 
We have three major results. First, there is a crowding out effect of fiscal policy on interest rates: a 
fall in the surplus (higher deficit) raises interest rates. Second, the spillover effect is not particularly 
stable. The spatial lag coefficient varies in a rather large band between 0 and 40 basis points 
since the mid nineties, but there are some strong drops in 1994 and 2004. Finally, both effects 
vary over time. We can distinguish three different episodes. In the first half of the nineties, fiscal 
policy has hardly got any crowding out effects. Foreign interest rates tend to go in the opposite 
direction of domestic rates. In a second period, which goes from the mid nineties to the year 2000, 
crowding out is significant and large. At the same time, spillover becomes stronger as well. 
Starting in 1999, crowding out and spillover both become less pronounced. There is a gradual 
decline in the estimated coefficients   and  . These results are also corroborated by the 
findings of a cross-section estimation of the spatial error model. 
 
These results teach us some important lessons. First, if we compare these findings with our panel 
estimates with time period effects, we cannot clearly attribute the smaller spillover effect to 
common shocks only. There is an important change in the crowding out effect as well.  
It is not surprising that spatial links are increasingly important in explaining the transmission of 
interest rates across borders. Increasing globalisation is believed to have spurred capital mobility 
and increased trade flows. Linkages on international markets have certainly become much 
stronger than they were a decade ago. Moreover, the nineties have seen several large crises that 
have spread to other countries. The 1994 Tequila crisis in Mexico was the first big ‘fiscal crash’. 
The Asian Flu that started in 1997 in Thailand set off a series of problems in the Asian Tigers, but 
spread globally. Russia defaulted in 1998 after Brazil had devalued the real a few months before. 
Argentina defaulted in 2001 and Turkey experienced fiscal and monetary trouble in the same year. 
Since then, no major ‘emerging market’ crisis has occurred. We find a break in spillover: there are 
no significant spatial links since 2001. In contrast to the nineties, domestic crises have had much 
less impact abroad in recent years. There could be two reasons for this. First, domestic crises are 
less serious now than they were in the nineties. Second, even though financial and economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
15 Data on inflation expectations are not available for all countries in the sample. 
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integration are progressing, contagion is now much weaker. Other studies have also found that 
spillover has become much weaker in recent years. Forbes and Chinn (2004) also find evidence 
of stronger links over the period 1996-2000. Didier et al. (2006) show that the co-movement of 
emerging market bond spreads and returns have been declining since 2000. Mauro et al. (2006) 
present similar results. 
 
The reasons for the changes in the crowding out effect are unclear. Large international crises can 
explain the large crowding out effect in the mid nineties. In fact, some – but not all – of the 
emerging market crises started with domestic fiscal problems. High and rapidly growing public 
debt cast current monetary policy strategies into doubt, and meant high interest rates to prevent 
capital from fleeing the country. This is only a partial explanation, however. For lack of data, we 
have not been able to include many emerging markets in the sample. And even if these 
economies in crisis had a global impact, the mere size of their budget problems is probably too 
small to affect interest rates in industrialised economies. Instead, fiscal policy in both the US and 
the EU was much more focused on debt consolidation in the nineties. The Clinton Administration 
governed a 10% reduction in public debt in the span of five years, in part helped by the strongly 
booming economy. In addition, EU countries decided on a common fiscal retrenchment and a 
strict monetary policy stance to prepare for EMU. EU countries had to abide by the rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact in order to qualify for the eurozone. After this joint consolidation effort, 
budget discipline has become less tight. It should not come as a surprise that after the entry in the 
EMU in 1999, crowding out is much smaller. 
 
5 SOME ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
5.1 Global or local linkages 
 
We immediately pick up on the previous explanation for the change in the crowding out effect. 
Fiscal consolidation in the EU countries might indeed be responsible for the large crowding out 
effect in the mid nineties. There are additional reasons to expect a stronger spillover effect 
between EU member states over time. Strong interlinkages are the consequence of ongoing 
economic and financial integration, and this must have strengthened the spillover of economic 
policies between these countries. In addition, for those EU countries participating in monetary 
union, spillover may even be stronger. A common monetary policy has spurred financial 
integration and probably also trade links. If different governments borrow in the same currency, as 
in a monetary union, free riding makes each government disregard its own intertemporal budget 
constraint (Chari and Kehoe, 2007). A variety of reasons may be invoked for the lack of credibility 
of the no bailout clause that prevents other governments (or the central bank) from rescuing the 
insolvent government. The offsetting interest rate effects do not need to materialise then, as 
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default premia are spread out over all members of the union.16 In the absence of agreements 
specifying the fiscal relations between governments, the crowding out effect depends – ceteris 
paribus – on the aggregate fiscal policy stance of all member states. 
 
Could spatial links be stronger between particular groups of countries, or are capital markets truly 
global? We run the same baseline model for some subsamples of countries. We are particularly 
interested in the subgroup of EU countries. The results of the spatial tests must be taken with 
some caution since we include only 13 EU countries. The properties of spatial panel tests are 
instead asymptotically valid.  
 
Table 4 summarises the results of the different specifications of the spatial panel. Crowding out is 
much less significant for an EU country. In contrast to the ‘global’ sample, a 1% deficit raises 
interest rates by only 10 basis points. Notwithstanding, the total effect on interest rates is much 
larger due to the spillover effect. Nearly 90% of an interest rate rise is transmitted to other EU 
countries. A 1% deficit raising domestic rates by 10 points will – in a second step – cause a rise in 
foreign rates of about 9 basis points. Hence, deficits will raise interest rates by nearly the same 
amount at home as in another EU country. As before, the panel with fixed or random effects gives 
very similar results. There is again some evidence that common shocks are driving interest rates. 
The results of the spatial panel model are somehow altered when accounting for time period fixed 
effects. The spillover effect is much weaker, and the crowding out effect is completely absent. As 
regards the source of the spillover, there is not much evidence to identify the role of financial or 
economic integration in the transmission of interest rates across EU countries. The estimates of 
the spatial error model show an important spillover effect, but no crowding out. 
 
Most studies have examined spillover between OECD countries. We look at the industrialised 
economies, but exclude the most recently acceded member states. Our baseline results for the 
global sample are not much affected: crowding out effects are significant and spatial links are 
rather large. The estimates are of the same order as for the global sample. 
 
5.2 Different weight matrices 
 
For all previous results, we have used a measure of geographical distance as a proxy for cross 
country economic linkages. We check if the results are robust to other definitions of the weight 
matrix W, and focus on the spatial panel lag model with fixed effects.17 We first try out some 
different measures of distance. We alternatively measure the (inverted) distance between 
countries as the distance between capital cities, or the great circle distance between country 
                                                          
16 Yardstick comparisons across governments may partially undo this spillover, if the accumulation of debt by one 
government increases the relative creditworthiness of comparable governments. 
17 This result is robust for the other panel models. 
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centroids.18 Table 5 shows that the point estimates are very similar, and so is the significance of 
both effects. A more common choice of the weighting matrix in spatial studies is physical 
contiguity. Countries that share a common border are believed to transmit effects to their direct 
neighbours, but no effect at all to far-away countries. Under this type of transmission mechanism, 
crowding out is only marginally stronger, but the spatial effect is negative. The reason is that 
border links are an awkward choice, as there are plenty of missing observations in our sample. 
Only a few European countries share a common border, but most other economies are isolated 
from each other (i.e., there are many zeros in the weighting matrix). This downplays the 
importance of spatial transmission. 
 
Physical distance is at best a proxy for the integration of countries’ financial markets, but still gives 
little economic content to ‘being close’. Our estimates of the spillover effect could be quite 
conservative as a consequence. We experiment with some more ‘economic’ weight matrices. It is 
often argued that trade is a major channel for economic transmission across countries. We 
therefore use different possible weight matrices incorporating bilateral exports and imports. We 
scale total exports from country i to country j by total exports of country i.19 Similarly, for imports of 
country j we scale by total imports of country j.20 We also weigh by total trade, summing bilateral 
exports and imports, and dividing by total trade of the country. As a consequence, these weight 
matrices are asymmetric: the strength of the transmission depends on the size and importance of 
each country. For example, the US may trade a lot with Colombia, yet the importance of this trade 
volume for the US economy is tiny. In contrast, for Colombia, US trade is much more important. 
We would expect the spillover from the US to Colombia to be much stronger than vice versa. This 
weight matrix better reflects the strength of transmission from large to small economies. 
Surprisingly, none of the results of the baseline model is altered very much. The crowding out 
effect is as large as before, and so is the spatial effect. Keleijan et al. (2006) similarly find little 
differences between the use of trade or distance matrices in their analysis of financial market 
spillover. This result confirms that distance is a good proxy for trade and economic relations in a 
gravity model. 
One might argue that trade is endogenous to the strength of the economic links. We choose an 
alternative weight matrix that has a dummy if two countries are in a free trade agreement. This 
results in a slightly stronger crowding out effect, and weaker spatial links. However, the results 
could be biased. There are a few countries only that do not have some kind of bilateral trade 
agreement in our sample. As a consequence, the importance of spatial links is probably 
understated. 
 
                                                          
18 A great circle is the shortest path between two points along the surface of a sphere. 
19 All data are in USD, trade data are FOB or CIF. Spatial panel models cannot handle time varying weight matrices. We 
arbitrarily fix exports and imports at a base year in the mid-of-sample (1998). Two countries are ‘close’ if they have 
strong bilateral trade (relative to the other trading partners). In contrast to the literature on contagion, we do not use the 
competition for export shares on third markets (Forbes and Chinn, 2004). 
20 The two numbers do not match for statistical reasons. This is known as the ‘missing trade’ problem. 
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The panel model provides an average effect of fiscal policy on interest rates, while arguably these 
crowding out and spillover effects may differ across countries. Changes in fiscal policy in the large 
industrialised economies are likely to have a larger effect on smaller economies. The transmission 
of economic events is likely to run in one direction. For example, measured by great circle 
distance, Germany is equally distant from France and Hungary. The impact of changes in the 
German economy is likely to be large for both countries. Yet, the inverse impact of the French 
economy on Germany is almost certainly much larger than that of the Hungarian economy. We 
control for the direction of spillover and the importance of transmission between economies by 
multiplying country size (GDP in USD PPP terms) by physical distance. Nonetheless, the results 
do not change much if we use this asymmetric weight matrix. 
 
Both industrialised and emerging market economies are increasingly open to financial markets. 
Financial integration between industrialised economies is gradually proceeding with economic 
integration. Instead, emerging market economies could be subject to contagious crises that 
spread from a crisis in another emerging market, but are unrelated to the economic fundamentals 
(and in particular the fiscal position) of the country itself. Economic crises may spread faster 
between emerging markets that are more exposed on financial markets, have similar 
macroeconomic characteristics or are prone to information asymmetries that trigger sunspot 
crises. As a final robustness check, we try to model these various channels of contagion. We 
capture the heterogeneity between industrialised and emerging economies by the difference in 
economic development. We use a weight matrix in which spatial links are stronger if the difference 
of (log) per capita income (in PPP USD) is smaller. We do not find significant differences in the 
crowding out effect, and the spatial effects remain as strong as with the other weight matrices. 
 
Our weight matrix is a rather rough attempt to distinguish links between industrialised and 
emerging market economies. We have not attempted to model these channels of contagion with 
alternative definitions of the weight matrix.21 It has been argued that these alternative channels 
may be less important than the classical transmission channels, such as trade (see the findings of 
Gerlach and Smets, 1995). Eichengreen and Rose (2001) and Forbes and Chinn (2004) also find 
that real and financial linkages are predominantly determined by ‘real’ trade integration. Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (2000) argue that trade or financial links are hard to distinguish, and hence often 
both specifications give very similar results.  
 
5.3 Alternative data definitions 
 
                                                          
21 Alternative definitions could be: interest rate spread, stock market index, exchange rate regime, real exchange rate, 
competition for bank lending, or international reserves. Data on these other channels are unfortunately not completely 
available for all countries in our sample. 
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Fiscal policy is argued to affect interest rates at long horizons. This can be tested in most 
industrialised economies that are able to issue long term bonds at a horizon of ten or more years. 
Not that many countries outside the OECD have been able to issue long term bonds, however. 
Most developing economies can only get finance on capital markets at short horizons, and have 
financed deficits with short term bonds at a 5 years horizon at most. We add to the sample those 
countries that issue government bonds at a horizon shorter than five years, and also use a short- 
to medium term interest rate (of 1 to 5 years) as our dependent variable for the countries in the 
initial sample. Table 6 gives the results of the spatial panel lag model with fixed effects. For the 
baseline model, the results barely change. If we augment the model with some additional control 
variables, the results still do not change very much. This is surprising, given that with a few 
exceptions (Barth et al., 1984), the literature usually does not find effects of deficits on short term 
rates (Cebula, 2000). We also add several control variables to this specification, and confirm the 
results of section 4.3. The crowding out effect is weaker when we add public debt, but the spillover 
effect becomes much stronger. If we add inflation, only the spillover effect is important. When data 
are available, we also add as a control the long term rate. In this case, both the crowding out and 
spillover effect disappear. 
 
The level of interest rates is determined by many other factors than fiscal policy. As argued in 
section 4.3, it is the level of public debt that determines crowding out. The addition of new stock of 
public debt should instead put additional pressure on the change in interest rates. Hence, instead 
of using the level of interest rates as the dependent variable, one should use the first difference 
instead. Table 6 shows that this does not affect the estimates of the crowding out effect, nor of the 
spillover. The addition of control variables does not change our conclusions. 
 
Finally, some other studies have used the yield to filter out any of the short term effects of fiscal or 
monetary policy, and analyse the impact of expected deficits on interest rates. The argument is 
that higher future deficits translate into higher interest rates in the future, and hence, a steepening 
of the yield curve. By using the yield as the dependent variable, there is no need to model the 
factors that drive the level of interest rates. We subtract from the long term interest rate the short 
term rate, and use this yield as a dependent variable. The estimation of the baseline model does 
not show very different results, even if we add the usual control variables. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
There is much discussion about the effect of fiscal expansions on interest rates. This variety in 
opinion is due to the little robust empirical endorsement for crowding out. A lack of response of 
interest rates can be justified under two different theoretical conditions. First, under Ricardian 
Equivalence, deficits do not affect macroeconomic variables as economic agents anticipate the 
paydown of higher deficits with future taxes. Second, capital flows between economically 
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integrated economies offset any interest rate differentials that follow upon an increase in the 
supply of government bonds. Fiscal deficits are not necessarily financed by domestic financial 
resources only. Financing conditions of governments depend on international capital markets. 
 
Theoretical models of open economies displaying non-neutrality of debt and including long term 
interest rates have not been developed. With little theoretical guidance, the robustness of the 
empirical tests is important. In this paper, we concentrate on modelling the crowding out effect of 
deficits on interest rates in open economies. We extend a simple empirical model for testing 
crowding out and test it with spatial techniques. Spatial models impose few restrictions on the 
spillover, as the contemporaneous interactions on many capital markets is taken into account. 
 
Our main finding is that there are significant and robust effects of larger deficits on interest rates. 
Spillover mitigates this effect. It is not obvious that this spillover is related to fiscal policy directly, 
as both financial and economic integration may drive the spillover. Spillover is much stronger in 
the mid-nineties when there are major crises, or policy actions have been coordinated between 
governments. We find the spillover effect to be particularly strong among EU countries. 
 
Our results have some implications for fiscal policy. The argument for coordination of fiscal policy 
is perhaps not convincing in case the spillover occurs on capital markets. After all, the mitigating 
effect of financial markets is a purely pecuniary externality and does not really require international 
coordination. The allocation of savings to the public or private sector, whether at home or abroad, 
is efficient. Nonetheless, in case spillover is related to contagion on financial markets (in the case 
of emerging economies) or to monetary union (in the case of EMU) this distorts capital markets. 
Some institutional correction mechanisms might then be necessary. Given that crowding out, and 
spillover, is quite strong in the EMU, this justifies fiscal rules as in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
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TABLES
 
 
Table 1. Baseline model, pooled and panel estimates; and spatial panel lag model (W-
matrix=distance).
    t-stat   t-stat  
 pooled -1.09 -5.22 - - - 
panel, fixed effects -1.16 -5.30 - - 
panel, random effects -1.06 -5.20 - - 
 
panel 
Hausmann test statistic 15.05 (0.00)     
panel, fixed effects -0.45 -4.54 0.55 8.09 - 
panel, random effects -0.46 2.02 0.51 0.00  spatial lag 
panel, spatial + time 
period fixed effects -0.43 -4.09 -0.05 -0.37  
 
 
Table 2. Baseline model, spatial panel error model (W-matrix=distance). 
   t-stat 
  t-stat 
panel, fixed effects -0.44 -4.17 0.56 8.42 
panel, random effects -0.48 -4.26 0.52 5.28 
panel, spatial + time period fixed effects -0.43 -4.10 -0.06 -0.43 
 
 
Table 3. Augmented model, spatial panel lag model, spatial fixed effects, specifications (W-
matrix=distance): tntntntntn XWisi ,,,,,  
    t-stat   t-stat   t-stat 
 baseline -0.45 -4.54 0.55 8.09 - - 
debt -0.16 -2.94 0.73 17.28 -0.00 2.07 
short term interest rate 0.00 0.00 -0.53 -2.98 0.04 2.78 




tX  
inflation 0.01 0.29 0.34 3.37 0.01 0.28 
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Table 4. Baseline model, spatial panel lag, country groups (W-matrix=distance). 
EU15                                       (number of observations = 208) 
spatial lag   t-stat   t-stat 
panel, fixed effects -0.10 -2.54 0.86 36.46 
panel, random effects -0.11 2.02 0.86 33.37 
panel, spatial + time period fixed effects -0.01 -0.09 0.29 2.56 
spatial error   t-stat 
  t-stat 
panel, fixed effects -0.03 -0.52 0.88 43.35 
panel, random effects -0.21 -3.77 0.81 22.13 
panel, spatial + time period fixed effects 0.00 -0.09 0.26 2.31 
     
OECD                                       (number of observations = 352) 
spatial lag   t-stat   t-stat 
panel, fixed effects -0.45 -4.54 0.55 8.09 
panel, random effects -0.46 1.54 0.53 6.69 
panel, spatial + time period fixed effects -0.43 -4.09 -0.05 -0.37 
spatial error   t-stat 
  t-stat 
panel, fixed effects -0.44 -4.17 0.56 8.42 
panel, random effects -0.48 -4.26 0.52 5.28 
panel, spatial + time period fixed effects -0.43 -4.10 -0.06 -0.43 
Table 5. Baseline model, spatial panel lag model, various weight matrices. 
   t-stat   t-stat 
panel, fixed effects 
inverted distancea) -0.45 -4.54 0.55 8.09 
inverted distance b) -0.48 -4.81 0.40 5.72 
circle distance -0.45 -4.57 0.53 7.59 
border -0.64 -5.62 -0.24 -3.86 
country size*distance -0.45 -4.54 0.55 8.09 
exports -0.45 -4.55 0.55 9.37 
imports -0.45 -4.57 0.55 9.09 
trade -0.45 -4.55 0.54 9.11 
free trade area -0.54 -5.16 0.20 1.96 
GDP per capita -0.48 -4.76 0.41 5.83 
panel, random effects 
inverted distance a) -0.46 2.02 0.51 0.00 
inverted distance b) -0.49 2.09 0.37 5.15 
circle distance -0.47 1.63 0.50 6.62 
border -0.53 2.75 0.19 0.00 
country size*distance -0.46 2.05 0.53 0.00 
exports -0.49 2.30 0.40 5.15 
imports -0.48 2.22 0.43 0.00 
trade -0.48 2.24 0.44 0.00 
free trade area -0.55 2.30 0.18 3.52 
GDP per capita -0.49 1.96 0.37 0.00 
panel, spatial and time period fixed effects 
inverted distance a) -0.43 -4.09 -0.05 -0.37 
inverted distance b) -0.43 -4.11 0.04 0.48 
circle distance -0.43 -4.09 -0.05 -0.39 
border -0.44 -4.09 -0.24 -3.82 
country size*distance -0.43 -4.09 -0.05 -0.37 
exports -0.43 -4.06 0.10 1.12 
imports -0.43 -4.07 0.06 0.58 
trade -0.43 -4.06 0.08 0.83 
free trade area -0.41 -3.94 -0.11 -0.88 
GDP per capita -0.43 -4.10 0.01 0.14 
Notes: (a) distance between centroids of the country coordinates; (b) distance between capital cities.
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Table 6. Augmented model, spatial panel lag model, spatial fixed effects, specifications (W-
matrix=distance): tntntntntn XWisi ,,,,,   
dependent short term interest rate   t-stat   t-stat 
 baseline -0.52 -2.66 0.48 6.39 
debt -0.09 -2.03 0.77 21.39 
long term interest rate 0.03 0.16 0.14 1.23 




tX  
inflation 0.01 0.24 0.45 5.65 
dependent 
 long term interest 
rate 
  t-stat   t-stat 
 baseline -0.61 -2.72 0.44 5.44 
debt -0.09 -1.91 0.76 19.54 
short term interest rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 




tX  
inflation 0.01 0.24 0.42 5.09 
dependent   interest rate   t-stat   t-stat 
 baseline -0.56 -2.03 0.29 3.05 
debt -0.09 -2.03 0.77 21.39 
long term interest rate 0.14 0.65 0.21 1.94 




tX  
inflation 0.05 1.62 0.44 5.77 
dependent yield   t-stat   t-stat 
 baseline -0.52 -2.66 0.48 6.39 
debt -0.12 -2.94 0.73 17.95 




tX  
inflation 0.03 1.03 0.35 3.84 
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FIGURES
 
Figure 1. Baseline model, spatial model estimates (W=distance matrix). 
(a) spatial lag model 
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(b) spatial error model 
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APPENDIX. Data 
 
Table A.1 Data sources. 
series definition source 
interest rate 1 to 5 year government 
bond yield or 
corresponding (%) 
IMF/IFS 
Central Banks 
surplus  surplus/GDP ratio (%) IMF General government 
Statistics 
public debt debt / GDP ratio (%) IMF General government 
Statistics 
short term interest rate central bank, T-bill 3 
months or corresponding 
(%) 
IMF 
long term interest rate 10 year government bond 
yield or corresponding (%) 
IMF 
GDP per capita US $ PPP Penn World Tables 
exports export CIF IMF Dots 
imports import FOB IMF Dots 
distance great circle distance Matlab 
common border  authors 
dummies trade agreement WTO 
country characteristics latitude/longitude Rose (2000) 
 
